Donald Trump’s expected foreign policy toward Europe during his second term will have far-reaching and possibly serious consequences.
Late last week, journalist Nicolas Wincour suggested that decades of close Europe-US relations were about to end, no matter who wins the White House. And Europeans should worry less about the presidency and “more about how Europe can hack it alone on a dangerous global stage”. Yesterday’s dismissive disappointment over the decline in American commitment to Europe is today’s cautionary tale. But after Trump became President, this concern has increased significantly, especially regarding trade and defense.
In his first presidential term Trump launched a series of tariffs, tit-for-tat and trade wars with states, companies and regions, including the European Union. This trend will continue if Trump’s campaign promises are to be believed, which included imposing 10-20% tariffs on all imports, with a particular focus on major states such as Germany and major companies including Mercedes-Benz.
Trump’s stated priority is to reset supply chains to American benefit, either through eye-wateringly high tariffs or ensuring greater post-production assembly of foreign goods in the US. These are really big stakes. The US is the EU’s largest trading partner, purchasing ever-increasing amounts of goods and services.
Is Europe ready?
The European Commission is not only sharpening its teeth on a number of trade, tech, AI and investment-related mechanisms designed to keep Trump-upmanship at bay. But preparations for the much-anticipated trade war have already been made, at least in terms of protecting the EU’s financial interests.
The European Commission focuses on increasing the EU’s overall self-reliance in big tech, including climate technology and raw materials. This would likely invite debate with the US, as well as unresolved arguments over steel.
Trump’s dislike for Europe is nothing new. And it’s not entirely personal. There are no longer policymakers in Washington with natural sympathy for Europe or even personal connections to Europe. Even under Presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden, Washington clearly, and possibly permanently, shifted away from both Europe and NATO toward Asia.
Whether downsizing troop levels or declining diplomatic interest in Europe among State Department officials, American attitudes toward Europe range from indifferent at best to hostile at worst.
The United States has turned toward Asia in the 2000s, moving beyond post-Cold War levels of cooperation in 1994. Now, because of deep partisanship, isolationism, and Trump’s second victory, Washington is content with “the decline of Europe in the psyche of the American elite.”
Despite this (as argued by retired US Army officer and former Commanding General Ben Hodges) it seriously undermined “the enormous advantage we (the US) have with our leadership inside NATO and our relationships with European countries”. Is. As president, Trump is simply going to accelerate this trend.
in the baltics
There are already expectations in the Baltic countries that Trump will pressure European states for higher defense spending. However, in the eyes of some people, Trump’s demand is not a bad thing in itself.
As Indrek Kannik, director of the Tallinn-based International Center for Defense and Security, argues: “If the US spends 3.5 to 4 percent on security, while Europe only spends 1.5 to 2 percent, that’s an imbalance.”
Kannik’s suggestion that “Europe will gradually take more responsibility for its own defense” echoes the perspective increasingly advocated in Brussels. Indeed: it is time for Europe to finally admit its weak, fragmented approach to defense coordination.
Others fear that Trump 2.0 “will be so hostile toward Europe… that the bloc will have no choice but to increase its defense spending”.
For the Baltics, the question of improving defense coordination and sorting out financing is important to deal with the threat of a region-hungry Putin on their borders.
Wake up, NATO?
Last time, Trump fiercely criticized NATO, mainly because the US provides the largest share of defense spending. Trump’s view in 2016 was that this encouraged free-riding among other members, who were happy to contribute less at America’s expense.
This time, Trump has stepped up his criticism that NATO allies are still failing to spend enough. This prompted Trump to suggest that he would encourage Russia to do “whatever they want” to NATO allies that failed to pay the bill.
This leaves open the question whether the US itself would defend another member in the event of an attack, or leave the organization.
Trump’s choices regarding Ukraine are simple: either arm it, or deny it aid. The former risks freezing the war and imposing an incomplete peace on Ukraine, while the latter gives Russian President Vladimir Putin a satisfactory victory, bringing an aggressive Russia to the doorstep of the EU and NATO.
This is particularly worrying for the Baltic states: should Ukraine prevail, the eastern flank of the EU and NATO would be exposed, which in turn would destabilize European collective security.
From a foreign policy perspective, the frustration is that European decision makers can’t be sure what Trump will actually do next. As journalist Janan Ganesh recently observed, America “had much more than just overwhelming power at its peak. There was a certain amount of predictability in it. Without these two, it would not have the same buy at events”.
friends in some places
Trump’s victory will be warmly welcomed by some Europeans, especially those from far-right parties, who will now be confident in a White House that shares their ideological outlook. Similarly, Trump may also actively support the far-right governments in Hungary and Italy.
There are many opportunities. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has spent years developing a personally deep relationship with Trump and the Maga-Republicans. And Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni could continue the same balancing act within the EU on key issues, including immigration.
Others, like the UK and the European Commission, will either have to play the pragmatic card, or be prepared to hit back, and strike back hard against everything from isolationist tariffs to fading defense commitments.
,Author: Amelia Hadfield, Head of Politics, University of Surrey)
,disclosure statement: Amelia Hadfield is the founder of the Center for Britain and Europe, which has received Erasmus+ funding from the European Commission)
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)
