Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Poland and Ukraine expands the geopolitical scope of India’s foreign policy. No Indian Prime Minister has visited Poland for the last 45 years. In recent years, Poland has gained considerable weight within the European Union (EU). It is a large country in terms of size and population, and has seen impressive economic growth since 1992, making it the EU’s sixth largest economy.
Modi has visited many countries where no Prime Minister from India had visited for a long time. This is part of the strategy to increase India’s global footprint in line with our aspirations to play a bigger role on the world stage. In this context, the visit to Poland seemed necessary, albeit late.
The Ukraine trip had become inevitable
No Indian prime minister has visited Ukraine since Ukraine’s independence in 1991. India has had productive relations with Ukraine, especially in the defence sector, but these have been adversely affected by the conflict with Russia following a change of power in the country in 2014. Modi will be the first Indian prime minister to visit Ukraine. There may be debate over whether the conditions still exist for a bilateral visit by a prime minister to Ukraine. However, at a geopolitical level it can be argued that the visit has become more or less inevitable.
Poland’s hostility towards Russia, rooted in history, is very deep. The country’s current president and especially the foreign minister, as well as the prime minister, reflect this in their statements. This internal hostility towards Russia also explains the depth of Poland’s relationship with the US. Since 2008, Poland has hosted elements of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, which Russians believe is targeted against them, although the US claims it is directed against Iran’s missile capability. Poland strongly supports Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. As it happens, the western part of Ukraine is historically linked to Poland.
Is this the right time?
It can be argued that India needs to reach out to Central and Eastern European countries to expand its political influence within the EU, with which it wants to strengthen ties. However, the issue is whether it is appropriate to do so at a time when both Ukraine and Poland are embroiled in a military confrontation with Russia as frontline countries supported by the US and NATO.
A proxy war is being waged against Russia through Ukraine, with the full support of Poland, whose declared goal is to impose a strategic defeat on Russia, its economic collapse and its international isolation, even if these goals have not yet been achieved. The question arises whether we should take into account Russia’s sensitivities and concerns, when it has been our privileged strategic partner for decades and has stood by us even when we were under pressure from the West.
To what extent should we stand in solidarity with Russia when we have no quarrel with it and maintain distance from its adversaries, and, in this context, to what extent should we maintain the independence of our foreign policy and our strategic autonomy vis-à-vis all our major partners in the East and the West, are pertinent questions.
Of course, one could argue that we are not stopped by our ever-closer ties with the US, which is the main promoter of the proxy war against Russia, or by our efforts to enhance ties with countries such as France and Germany, within or with the EU, which are also promoting this proxy war. This logic should dictate that we should not be stopped from reaching out to Ukraine and Poland.
Limitations of foreign policy
But then, foreign policy is not based on logic or mechanically applied principles. Policymakers have to assess where the balance of interests lies and what the potential cost would be of not weighing the consequences of the choices made. If we want to keep Russia firmly on our side, are there choices we should avoid to avoid misunderstanding or creating the impression that we are harming Moscow’s legitimate interests? We can certainly assume that Russia is a mature power with a lot of experience in diplomacy, and can assess that the decision we take is to advance our legitimate national interests and is not intended to harm Russia’s interests. India and Russia do not have to be on the same page on everything. Even the US and its allies in Europe have differences.
The issue in the case of Modi’s visit to Poland and Ukraine this time is that both countries have avoided the language of dialogue and diplomacy to resolve the Ukraine conflict, with Ukraine and its NATO backers favouring some military success on the ground to force Russia to come to the negotiating table. This strategy assumes that Russia wants to avoid war with NATO, which gives the military alliance space to support limited escalatory actions to impose costs on Moscow. This is NATO’s version of a decommissioning strategy that Russia replicates when it believes NATO will tire of supporting war because it is imposing costs on member countries, and the public is already tired.
Staying Consistent
From India’s perspective, Modi’s visit to Russia for the annual summit is likely to be put on the agenda with a clear intention to develop stronger economic ties, and after once again signalling to the West that India will maintain the dignity of its relations with Moscow, a visit to Ukraine is likely to be put on the agenda.
Modi appears to have told Putin during his visit that Zelensky was pressuring him to visit Ukraine and that he was planning to go. Apparently, Putin did not object to this. It could be argued that it would have seemed inconsistent for Modi to have counselled dialogue and diplomacy within Russia as well as internationally and then refused to visit Ukraine to promote his message of dialogue and diplomacy on Ukrainian soil.
Offensive of Kursk by Ukraine
Regretfully, Zelensky has undermined its purpose by making his highly symbolic incursion in Kursk just days before Modi’s visit. The US and other countries are pushing India to play a supporting role in promoting a solution to the conflict in Ukraine, given New Delhi’s close ties with Moscow. They are being dishonest in promoting this line. If the US wants to seriously negotiate with Russia to find ways to end the conflict, it does not need the intervention of India or any other country. Russia has said many times in the past that the key to a solution lies in the hands of the US, not Europe or Ukraine.
In his post on X before departure, Modi said that in Ukraine, he would like to “share his perspectives on a peaceful resolution of the ongoing Ukraine conflict” with Zelensky. This interesting message suggests that he has a vision about how to end this conflict, which means he has a broad perspective plan in mind. In Moscow, Modi had said that he understood very well how Putin sees the situation. But now, after Kursk, Russia’s position has hardened, Putin has said that there is no room left for negotiations anymore.
Tough times in America
No doubt Zelensky will share his views with Modi. And then what? Will India come into some kind of mediating role? Is this possible when the US is in the throes of a presidential election, and Biden is a lame duck president who cannot change his course because any move towards seeking peace after promoting conflict for so many years could hurt the Democratic Party, as it would mean the failure of Biden’s Ukraine policy?
Even if Zelensky’s decision to make territorial incursions into Russia may have undermined Modi’s peace efforts, India can always claim that in view of the worsening of the situation, Modi’s message against escalation of tensions and in favour of peace has become even more urgent and relevant.
Point to be noted is that, The Economist Modi’s Ukraine visit is seen as “redemption”, implying that India has sinned and is now seeking forgiveness from the West. This underlines how the West views Modi’s visit. Presumably, this arrogant and egotistical magazine believes Modi is waiting for forgiveness from the high priests of defunct British imperialism.
(Kanwal Sibal was Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France and Russia and Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal views of the author
