For nearly a year, cross-border clashes between Israel and Hezbollah have escalated, while observers warn that this escalating war of words could plunge the region into a major conflict. The past few days have brought that catastrophic scenario closer to reality.
Israel first attacked with pagers and walkie-talkies, an unprecedented assault on Hezbollah’s communications that injured thousands of the organization’s activists. This was followed by the assassination of Ibrahim Aqeel, a prominent Hezbollah leader, who was killed in an airstrike that also killed other senior commanders of the terrorist group as well as some civilians. Hezbollah responded by expanding the geographical range of its rockets fired at Israel, targeting military facilities and civilian areas in northern Israel. Israel then launched a new airstrike that killed more than 270 people, according to Lebanese health officials, causing thousands of residents from south Lebanon to flee to the north of the country.
As a scholar of Lebanon and Israel, I have followed the dynamics of this war since October 8, 2023, the day Hamas launched an unprecedented and deadly attack on Israel, which was responded to by bombing the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah then began firing rockets into northern Israel in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza.
Despite high rhetoric and mutual threats of destruction, until recently neither Israel nor Hezbollah, nor Hezbollah’s sponsor Iran, has shown interest in full-scale war. All sides certainly know the potentially devastating consequences of any such situation for themselves: Israel has the military power to devastate Beirut and other parts of Lebanon as it did in Gaza, while even a weakened Hezbollah could fire thousands of missiles at Israel’s strategic sites, from the airport to central Tel Aviv, water supply lines and power centers, and offshore gas rigs.
So instead, they have exchanged gunfire and blows across their shared border, with some agreed red lines regarding the geographical scope of attacks and efforts not to deliberately target civilians.
But recent Israeli attacks in Lebanon have turned the pages of this war to a new and far more serious one, pushing the region to the brink of all-out war. Such a war would wreak havoc in Lebanon and Israel, and could also drag Iran and the United States into direct confrontation. In doing so, it would also fulfill the intention of Hamas gunmen, who killed nearly 1,200 Israelis on October 7, hoping that a harsh Israeli response would draw more groups across the region.
A dangerous ‘new phase’
Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has insisted throughout nearly a year of hostilities that his group would only halt its firing if Israel and Hamas reached a ceasefire agreement. However, in recent weeks Israel has taken the conflict in the opposite direction.
The country’s Defense Minister Yoav Galant described the coordinated attacks on Hezbollah positions as a “new phase” and said the “center of gravity” in the war was moving north into Lebanon. The Israeli government has added “the safe return of the residents of the north to their homes” as an additional goal of the war.
The attack on Hezbollah’s communications system targeted the organization’s operatives, but also injured many civilians, leaving the Lebanese people in shock, trauma, anger and frustration.
It demonstrated Israel’s tactical military edge over Hezbollah. The unprecedented penetration into the heart of the organization’s command and rank-and-file structures has never been seen before in any conflict or war around the world. It hit Hezbollah at its most vulnerable spots and even exposed its coordination with Iran – one of those injured in the pager blasts was the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon.
The killing of Aqeel two days later was another sign that the Israeli government has now decided to try to change the rules of this risky game of retaliation and counter-retaliation. It is clear that instead of the uncomfortable status quo of this war that has lasted for almost a year, Israel now intends to put pressure on Hezbollah and force it to surrender.
getting out of control
Nasrallah delivered a sombre and defiant speech after the Pejner attack. While acknowledging that the operation had caused great damage to Hezbollah, he defined the Israeli attack as a continuation of “many other massacres perpetrated by the enemy over the decades.”
By doing so, they presented it as a popular historical narrative among many Lebanese and Palestinians, who consider Israel a criminal entity that routinely commits genocide against innocent civilians.
Nasrallah also stressed that his commitment to support Hamas in Gaza remains unwavering.
Saying that Israeli actions have “crossed all red lines” and could amount to a declaration of war, Nasrallah also reiterated what he said at the previous peak of this ongoing conflict: that retaliation is coming, it’s only a question of timing and scale. By doing so, Nasrallah signaled that he may not yet be interested in a full-blown war.
Israel, on the other hand, appears less cautious. After nearly a year of tensions with Hezbollah, Israel’s leaders seem willing to risk an escalation that could spiral out of control.
It is difficult to determine what the strategy is behind Israel’s actions: since October 7; as the Biden administration has noted, Israel has not demonstrated a coherent strategy with clear political goals.
Rather, critics of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu say he is primarily motivated by his political survival and maintaining power as head of state, conflating Israel’s interests with his own.
Uniting the ‘Axis of Resistance’
So what options does Nasrallah have now, as he considers Hezbollah’s response, surely in consultation with Iran? After so many devastating blows to Nasrallah’s organization, it is hard to imagine that Hezbollah will be willing to halt its cross-border attacks, withdraw from the Israeli border, or abandon its commitment to support Hamas in Gaza.
On the other hand, after a year of avoiding a full-scale war, opting for it is fraught with risk—both Nasrallah and his sponsors in Tehran are well aware that such a war would bring heavy costs to Hezbollah, Lebanon, and possibly even Iran.
If Hezbollah now goes to war against Israel, it would be its most significant move since its founding in 1982. But it would do so with crippled communications systems and no significant role among its leadership — some of whom had worked closely with Nasrallah for decades and built up the organization’s military capacity with him.
In some respects, the Lebanese people being held hostage by Israeli and Hezbollah interests under Netanyahu are facing similar predicaments: their well-being is being sacrificed for other priorities.
Netanyahu’s recent statements about concern for Israeli civilians in the north ring hollow, given that for 11 months he has pursued policies that put them at greater risk while also opposing a Gaza ceasefire agreement that would also end hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah has dragged the country into this war against the will of the majority of the Lebanese people – a decision that has caused massive devastation in parts of a country already struggling with extreme political and economic crisis.
Nasrallah’s speech framed Hezbollah’s plight as the plight of all of Lebanon – while issuing a veiled threat that dissent would not be tolerated. Many Lebanese are undoubtedly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and angered by Israel’s war in Gaza. But at the same time, they may balk at the idea that their own well-being will have to be sacrificed in the process.
Meanwhile, Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader and the mastermind behind the October 7 massacre, must be watching the unfolding events between Israel and Hezbollah with satisfaction. His plan was to unite all fronts of the so-called “axis of resistance,” which includes the Houthis in Yemen as well as Hezbollah and other Iran-backed groups, hoping to wage a regional war against Israel.
One year later, we’re closer than ever to that scenario.
Editor’s note: This story was updated on Sept. 23, 2024, to include the latest developments in the field.
Asher Kaufman, Professor of History and Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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