Recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that the world’s nuclear powers are continuing to expand investments to strengthen their arsenals. While the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide is declining, the number of operational nuclear weapons is increasing. Of course, the US and Russia have the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons.
However, it is China that is reportedly expanding its nuclear arsenal “faster than any other country”. SIPRI researchers have estimated that the Chinese arsenal will have around 500 warheads by January 2024. According to US Department of Defense estimates, China is likely to have over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030. More importantly, the SIPRI report argues that for the first time, China has some warheads on high operational alert. Moreover, in the past few years, there have been increasing reports on Chinese efforts to increase the number of their ground, sea and air-based delivery platforms and infrastructure, such as intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos.
“Assured retribution”
Chinese nuclear strategy focuses on deterrence through “assured retaliation,” which is the ability to survive an initial attack and retaliate with nuclear strikes that inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. Moreover, like India, China has a long-standing no-first-use policy. Despite this, as detailed above, there has been a consistent effort by Beijing to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. It is important to understand three factors to understand why this has happened.
Also read | Explained: India has more nuclear weapons than Pakistan, but China is ahead
First, China’s assessment of the international security landscape, particularly US policy, has undergone tremendous changes over the past decade. China’s 2019 defense white paper criticized adjustments in US national security and defense strategies, as well as warned of an arms race. China-US relations have deteriorated further since then. Gradually, Beijing has come to feel that the US is pursuing a strategy of containment. Part of this approach is to consolidate US conventional military superiority as well as modernize strategic forces. Of particular concern is US talk about ‘low-yield’ or tactical nuclear weapons. Chinese analysts have argued that US policy appears to be lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Beijing’s concern is that US missile defense capabilities and new conventional systems, along with improvements in cyber and electronic warfare, could weaken China’s ability to launch a counterstrike.
“Stay Prepared”
Hence, the 2019 Defense White Paper called on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to “maintain an appropriate level of readiness and enhance strategic deterrence capabilities.” Subsequently, in March 2021, Xi Jinping instructed the military to accelerate the building of “advanced strategic deterrent” capabilities. Finally, in his work report to the 20th Party Congress, Xi committed to establishing “a strong system of strategic deterrence” and increasing “the proportion of new-domain forces with new combat capabilities.” This is particularly important given the growing tensions around Taiwan. A modern Chinese nuclear force potentially offers more room for maneuver for Beijing in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Also Read | China hikes defence budget by 7.2% amid rising regional tensions
Second, according to the 2019 Defence White Paper, one of the goals of enhancing strategic deterrence capability is to “maintain international strategic stability”. This, of course, is a significant extension of Chinese defence policy goals beyond simply protecting national sovereignty and security. It is also indicative of what Beijing sees as the essential instruments of power that superpowers should possess. In other words, there is an element of status-seeking that is driving the Chinese nuclear modernisation programme. For instance, at the start of his reign in December 2012, Xi called the Second Artillery Corps, later upgraded to the PLA Rocket Force, “a strategic pillar of China’s superpower status”. This does not mean that Beijing seeks nuclear parity with the US or Russia. Rather, it means that nuclear power is being seen as an instrument of power that needs to be developed to achieve political parity among major powers.
Stalled US-China talks
This connects to the third and final point, i.e. building negotiating power and setting global rules. After a very long hiatus, China and the US resumed official nuclear talks in November last year. Both sides described the talks as “frank” and “intensive”, but with no significant results. The US side demanded greater “transparency” and “substantive engagement” from China, while Beijing emphasised the importance of “mutual respect” and the need to adhere to a “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security approach”. More substantive talks have not progressed since then, although the first Track II talks between the two sides in five years took place in March. Meanwhile, China has called on nuclear-armed states to negotiate a no-first-use treaty or a political declaration. Beijing understands that shaping new rules can only be done from a position of strength.
Therefore, from the Indian perspective, it is important not to view China’s nuclear force modernisation only through the prism of parity and asymmetry. There are broader issues, such as confrontation between superpowers resulting in nuclear exchanges, that must be taken into account. Some of these issues, such as the threat of increased proliferation and support for Pakistan, are of deep concern. Meanwhile, others, such as the call for a no-first-use treaty, may provide opportunities to make common cause.
(Manoj Kewalramani is Chair of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institute.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal views of the author