Does the highly volatile situation in West Asia put pressure on multipolarity? This question needs to be addressed beyond US foreign policy. For John Mearsheimer, a prominent political scientist, the fight between Democrats and Republicans is akin to a choice between “Tweedledum and Tweedledee.” It is the deep state that drives American foreign policy, the primary objective of which is to maximize power and become a global hegemon. This is expressed by Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations, where he warned that the West’s inability to adapt to the growing power and influence of other civilizations would lead to the decline of its own power and influence, and would be the greatest threat to world peace.
The global order was largely unipolar since the Cold War, until Russia gained a foothold in Damascus during the Syrian civil war following the Arab Spring. Since then this world order is constantly being challenged. With the rise of the Global South, today’s world order has overturned the hegemonic power structure and is clearly moving towards multipolarity. The Tehran-Beijing-Moscow axis poses a major challenge to US global ambitions.
India and China have emerged as the two major contenders for leadership in the Global South. However, the nature of their approaches varies considerably. While China presents a direct conflict in the global north, India’s approach is more favourable.
As analysts have come to understand, these slowly but changing realities are also visible in the American deep state. As the balance of power theory suggests, Washington has chosen to strengthen and support New Delhi’s position. The renewed enthusiasm for the Quad and I2U2 groupings and its further expansion in the creation of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) are examples of this. However, herein lies the major challenge for Indian foreign policy, which has to juggle its various priorities – in the Global South, in managing its regional geopolitical compulsions, and in its strategic partnerships with key members of the Global North.
there was to be no peace
This churning in the politics of West Asia predates the ongoing war. Since the Arab Spring, when the United States decided to withdraw and turn to East Asia, regional regimes gradually abandoned their ‘clientele’ to seek other options. Over the past few years, the Arab League in the region began to see some semblance of an agreement with Syria, a peace process began between Damascus and Ankara, and the Abraham Accords formally normalized relations with Israel. Facility was provided. Had the Chinese-brokered deal between Riyadh and Tehran not been reached, the final closing photo might have been a handshake between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the US president at the center.
However, Hamas’ October 7 attack spoiled all this. Washington, which has seen its share of misadventures in Ukraine, has also been drawn back into the turmoil in West Asia.
Furthermore, Israel’s disregard for the observance of the rules of war and the resolutions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the United Nations (UN) has also led Riyadh to publicly condemn Tel Aviv and its opposition to any attempts at normalization until the establishment of a Palestinian state. Have been forced to stop the conversation. ,
India will have to make its own way
As India expands and enhances its labour-trade-energy engagement with West Asia, it will have to be careful on the diplomatic front. Considering its geo-strategic importance, it needs to reassess its position in Iran and remain cautious about its relations with the United States in the region. The attack on Israel by Iran on October 1 and the imminent response from Israel has opened a box of confusion. The potential tension would deeply alter the balance of power in the region and jeopardize India’s strategic interests.
Furthermore, the alleged involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in India’s friendly neighbor Bangladesh, its secondary sanctions on Indian entities for doing business with Russia and Republican candidate Donald Trump’s recent comments on India’s import policy are the latest examples of the complex nature of Are. of American foreign policy. Therefore, non-alignment will remain a key component of India’s foreign policy, even if only in the form of practical strategic autonomy.
At the same time, India’s world image is important for its leadership ambitions in the Global South. Although India supports a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, its decision to abstain from the UN General Assembly resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian territories may have an impact on its position.
Regarding competition with China, the popular discussion is largely wrong. India is not in a position to compete with China in the Middle East, mainly because they have different interests in the region. India, unlike China, does not want to become a power alternative to the United States. To argue that IMEC will challenge the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is wrong and baseless.
In short, foreign policy is not a zero-sum game. Beyond the US and China, New Delhi has its own case in the Middle East and the Global South.
(Mohammed Gulrez, former VC of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and PVC, Professor of Political Science in the Department of West Asian and North African Studies, AMU)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
