The killing of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in Israeli air strikes on the Daheeh suburb of Beirut, a predominantly Shia stronghold, was a tectonic event for both the group and the region. Nasrallah had been the leader of Hezbollah for more than three decades. The organization was designated a terrorist group by the US and others in 1997, two years before even Al Qaeda was given such a label. In response to his death, Iran has increased its aggression and launched ballistic missile attacks against Israel.
Hezbollah’s worst crisis so far
Today’s crisis for Hezbollah, founded in 1982 from the ashes of the Lebanese Civil War, is more existential in nature than ever before. Along with Nasrallah, much of the group’s military and political hierarchy has also been eliminated. Although Israeli attacks against Hezbollah’s leadership are not new, the 2006 Israel–Lebanon War, where Israel failed to inflict a crushing defeat, was a focal point of its strategic thinking. The 2008 assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, the group’s second-in-command in Syria and founder of the Lebanese Islamic Jihad organization, was a turning point, ultimately culminating in Israeli operations inside Lebanon over the past two months, such as targeting communication lines. Old pagers and walkie-talkies.
Moving forward, rebuilding Hezbollah in the post-Nasrallah era will not be easy. These attacks, followed by the real threat of region-wide escalation, would have given Israel ample time to hope for a political alternative to emerge within Lebanon, a country where Hezbollah was a state within a state and the general Used to challenge. Working of politics. Lebanon has had no president since 2022. Along with Nasrallah, the killing of senior Hezbollah commanders such as Southern Front chief Ali Karaki and Iranian commander Abbas Nilforoushan also significantly disrupted the chain of command. Iranian retaliation against Israel in the form of ballistic missiles was apparently unleashed in response to these killings.
Who will lead Hezbollah?
The group’s next leader is widely expected to be Hashem Saffiedine, a senior member and Nasrallah’s cousin. By some accounts, Saffieddin is more radical and less politically astute than his predecessor. Wearing a black turban, he believes he is a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. Saffiedine has very close ties to Iran and is believed to be married to the daughter of slain Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani.
If he becomes Hezbollah chief, Saffieddin will have to grapple with a larger reality. The decline in his group’s leadership is sure to have a significant impact. To this day, al Qaeda continues to struggle with the loss of its leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri; Reconstruction efforts seem slow and invisible at the moment. Hamas has also seen little activity at the top since the assassination (allegedly by Israel) of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran this July. Its new chief, Yahya Sinwar, has largely maintained radio silence. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that each such group or movement has unique character traits in terms of both existence and ideology, and that both of these traits are interconnected. Al Qaeda was largely based on a cult of personality, not Hezbollah.
what would the arab world want
Hezbollah’s fate and future will also depend on regional dynamics. Not only is Iran a key support pillar for the ‘axis of resistance’ built around the Palestine issue, but Hezbollah itself is more institutionally linked to Tehran’s constructs. While Hamas is a Sunni movement, Hezbollah is a quintessential representation of Shia power and influence in the region, and is therefore even more critical of Iranian thinking. While powers in the Arab world have tried to maintain a level of neutrality, given the fallout from the ongoing ‘Iran-vs-Israel’ crisis, the disengagement of both Hamas and Hezbollah would in all likelihood be a welcome step, Particularly the dirty work will fall on Israeli shoulders.
Going forward, the key question is who and what will replace the political void left behind. History is replete with examples of how ideologically motivated non-state extremist actors are easily able to force their way into power even before regional or international consensus-led political alternatives have materialized.
Could Iran cross the nuclear threshold?
Notably, Israel’s kinetic backlash is not merely symptomatic of the audacity of an existentialist state. The largest and yet least discussed military campaign that provided Israel – especially after 2006 – the space to build capabilities to counter Hezbollah, Hamas, and others, were its efforts to ensure that Iran and The staunchest enemies in Syria will be powerless. To achieve nuclear capability. Israeli air strikes in 2007 disabled Syria’s suspected nuclear program in the Deir ez-Zor region. The long and covert campaign against Iran’s nuclear program has also dealt a serious blow to Tehran. It is now considered a nascent nuclear state, but if the current trajectory continues, it may also move toward weaponization.
The next few months will remain unpredictable for West Asia, bringing it back to the core of international geopolitics, great power competition, nuclear instability and the possible redrawing of traditional influence architectures. After all, all these factors work together.
(The author is Deputy Director and Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
