China on September 25 launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from its territory into the depths of the Pacific Ocean, the first such test since the 1980s.
Beijing’s explanation of this extremely rare incident was casual, with the Ministry of National Defense (MND) downplaying this strike of a strategic weapon across the Pacific Ocean. China’s MND described the test as follows: “The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) launched a dummy weapon-carrying ICBM into the high seas in the Pacific Ocean at 08:44 am on September 25, and the missile hit the expected maritime areas. “This test launch is a routine arrangement in our annual training plan. It is in line with international law and international practice, and is not directed against any country or target.”
Of course, this ICBM launch was anything but a “routine” ICBM launch, as China has not conducted any such tests for 44 years. The incident was so significant that Beijing felt it necessary to warn selected countries, including France and the US, in advance.
Pentagon deputy spokeswoman Sabrina Singh acknowledged, “We had some advance notice of this ICBM test, and we believe it was a good thing. It was a step in the right direction, and it helps dispel any misconceptions or Miscalculations can be prevented.”
Singh said the United States had pressed China for “a more regular bilateral notification arrangement in the case of ballistic missiles and space launches.” He described it as “a common sense, confidence-boosting measure.”
China reached an agreement with Russia in 2009 that each side would inform the other about ballistic missile launches, but so far China has rejected all US suggestions for such a mechanism.
Warned in advance, the US Air Force deployed an RC-135S Cobra Ball aircraft – one of three in existence – to collect optical and electronic data on the missile and about halfway along its flight path. The USAF has described the RC-135 as “a national asset that is uniquely suited to provide America’s leaders and the defense community with critical information that cannot be obtained from any other source”.
The missile fell near French Polynesia’s exclusive economic zone, not far from the Marquesas Islands. China had sent its Yuan Wang 5 tracking ship near the landing site to collect data. New Zealand described ICBM testing as “undesirable and developmentally concerning”. In fact, countries like Australia, Japan and New Zealand had sought clarification from China.
Importantly, this test took place exactly ten years after the DF-31AG achieved its first launch on 25 September 2014. The symbolism and dates are important to the PLA, and the then-new missile used an elevated trajectory to limit its ground range. However, this latest provocative test comes at a time of rising tensions with neighbors such as Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan.
Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry immediately tweeted, “The PLA’s first ICBM launch in 44 years exposes the regime’s expansionist ambitions and malicious nature. Taiwan strongly condemns the PRC for its reckless moves destabilizing the region and calls for restraint from China.” Urges to take action and stop all actions that undermine global peace.” Peace efforts.” This was more than a routine test. China was sending a signal, which was intimidating.
China launched the missile from a rural area in the northern part of Hainan Island, a Chinese island located in the north of the South China Sea. The ICBM flew about 12,000 km. It is most notable that the distance between Hainan Island and Los Angeles on the west coast of the United States is approximately 12,100 km. China therefore effectively demonstrated its ability to reach the United States with this type of nuclear weapon, even if the new DF-41 has an even longer range.
American research organization CNA analyst Decker Eveleth further explained why China fired this missile in that direction. “Typically, the PLARF tests ICBMs from east to west, from the interior of the country to the northern desert. This is satisfactory for most system tests (many missile tests are actually conducted to test a specific subsystem). The problem is that this forces you to use a higher trajectory, the distance from the ICBM test site to the target range is about 2,000-3,000 kilometers, so China has to make its ICBMs much higher. This means that this is probably a quarter of the ICBM’s actual range, so if the PLARF wanted to test a suppressed trajectory, they would have to find another place like the Pacific Ocean to test their ICBMs. Will be required.”
Eveleth also identified a possible reason why the missile was fired from Hainan: “Another reason to do a test like this is to test the speed and the capability of your missile crews. Launching a missile is complex, and there are many types of If you mess with it, that missile will miss the target, especially considering that the ICBM they launched is almost certainly launched from a mobile launcher and has to be fired from a launch location. You can identify potential damage in the process that the missile crew may be unfamiliar with.”
Eveleth said there is a precedent for such end-to-end testing, with China doing something similar in 1966 with the DF-2. He said on that occasion that the PLA launch was “conducted partly to test the entire transport and launch support.” Infrastructure”. He suggested it was probably “the same deal” on this latest occasion.
This was a complex operation for the PLARF, as it involved the transportation of a massive HTF5980A 16×16 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) plus support vehicles from the Chinese mainland to Hainan Island. A photo circulated on the Internet and other photos of the launch released by the MND showed that the missile was launched from an unprepared site. Such a process with minimal supporting infrastructure makes it more difficult for an adversary to identify launch sites.
What type of missile was it? Most analysts agree that it was the DF-31AG, a variant that was publicly introduced at a parade in Beijing on 1 October 2019. The DF-31AG is externally similar to the earlier DF-31A, which suggests that the two ICBMs are not much different.
However, the latter uses a truck-and-trailer launcher unit, while the DF-31AG is more mobile on an eight-axle truck chassis. Eveleth published a PLARF order of battle in July 2023, where he described the DF-31AG as follows: “It is not clear at this point what, other than changes in transporter and support, there will be between the DF-31A and DF-31AG. What really makes the difference is the equipment. PLA military newspapers mention that the AG has upgraded the cabling, reducing the number of cables required and allowing faster data transmission times, but what changes were made to the missile are, it is still unknown.
“The big, big thing they want to modernize is the guidance system, which still relies on an ancient alignment system that the US got rid of in the 1990s,” the American researcher said. As Chinese state media still Talks about cable vanes and alignment, AG’s guidance system has probably not been modernized, it is possible that China is working on a new model that updates the guidance system that addresses these problems “
The PLARF’s 624th Missile Brigade is stationed in Hainan, but that unit has DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles. In fact, the closest DF-31AG unit to Hainan is the 632 Brigade stationed in Shaoyang (27.2532°N, 111.3859°E). It is about 800 km away from the Hainan launch site.
Eveleth estimated in its PLARF battle order for 2023 that China had 48–56 DF-31AG TELs. They listed the 621 Brigade in Yibin, the aforementioned 632 Brigade, 642 Brigade in Datong, 643 Brigade in Tianshui and 664 Brigade in Jiangyang as units operating the DF-31AG.
A report published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists earlier this year estimated that China had 64 DF-31AGs. The same document calculates that China currently possesses a total of 438 nuclear weapons, plus another 62 weapons that have been produced but not put into operation. This assessment is almost identical to the 500 warheads estimated in the Pentagon’s 2023 report on China’s military capabilities.
The Pentagon estimates that the PLARF’s nuclear weapons stockpile will reach 1,000 by 2030. Eveleth also predicts in its report that, by 2028, China will have more than 1,000 ballistic missile launchers. Of these, 507 will be nuclear-capable, 342-432 will be conventional missile launchers, and at least 252 will be dual-capable launchers.
However, Eveleth offered this opinion: “The most worrying change in China’s nuclear forces is not actually the numerical expansion in launchers, but rather their apparent shift away from a retaliation plan that involves firing nuclear missiles after an opponent has already completed an attack. A large number of firings were envisioned.” Chinese homeland in launch on alert (LW) posture Under launch on alert, an incoming nuclear attack is detected in flight with satellites and ground-based radar, preventing incoming missiles from attacking their targets. The first allows a state to retaliate.
“China’s developing LOW capability, coupled with solid-fuel missile silos, means they can quickly launch a nuclear strike at a moment’s notice. LOW posture presents new challenges in ensuring conventional conflicts remain Does.”
Chinese MND spokesman Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang said at a September 26 press conference, “China’s nuclear policy is very stable, consistent and predictable. We strictly adhere to the nuclear policy of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons , and attempt to create nuclear weapons.” Self-defense tactics.”
“We have pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear weapon-free zones,” Zhang said. China will continue to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level necessary for national security. “
Zhang further said that “At present, the overall defense relations between China and the United States have a more stable momentum. The two militaries maintain high-level strategic communication, policy communication, institutional dialogue and exchanges in special areas. These will help enhance engagement. Can help.” “Mutual understanding, avoid miscalculation and manage and control risks.”
China may be hoping to strengthen its international position as a global power by boasting a world-class military. The United States regularly tests long-range ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, so China is demonstrating it can do the same.
In fact, Beijing now appears to be disinterested in conducting military activities that mirror US activities. Therefore, perhaps a relevant question worth asking is whether this latest test has set a precedent for cross-border flight tests and whether China will continue to do so in the future. In 2019–20, China launched several DF-21D and DF-26 missiles in the South China Sea. That incident may have been an indication of the ongoing practice of dropping missiles into external waters.
Another objective of this test in the Pacific region could be to reassure the Chinese people and demonstrate the credibility of PLARF to the world. The above Bulletin of Nuclear Scientists report states, “China’s nuclear missile force readiness was challenged in early 2024 with the revelation that a US intelligence assessment had found that corruption within the People’s Liberation Army Confidence in it had diminished.” “Overall capabilities, especially when it comes to the rocket force.”
Also remember that the PLARF was deeply embroiled in a corruption scandal that led to the removal and prosecution of two top leaders of the force. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reports that “recent dismissals of top defense officials and widespread corruption may impact the Chinese leadership’s willingness to arm missiles in peacetime.”
The PLARF is a strategic force, but President Xi Jinping has been troubled by a lack of loyalty among its top leadership, and he was angered by rampant corruption in the organization. By demonstrating the ability to transfer a sophisticated ICBM and its launch equipment from the mainland by sea, and by firing a missile thousands of kilometers away at a distance sufficient to reach the United States, the PLARF clearly demonstrated to That the force is politically credible and that it is combat ready.
(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)